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Abstract 
The key purpose of this study is to examine the remarkable context within the 
evolution of the paradigm innovation in fashion product development, in the case 
of Japanese fashion apparel, UNIQLO, created by Fast Retailing Corp in 1998. 
The key theme hereby concerns innovation, and this perspective surely 
necessitates Fast Retailing’s strategic collaboration with a Japanese new 
material and artificial textile powerhouse, TORAY: as TORAY’s technological 
provision was an essential source for the dynamic product and process 
innovation behind the extraordinary growth of UNIQLO. Furthermore, the 
technological superiority also entailed its innovative positioning in market 
competition. It is crucial to examine how and why the two brought about their 
core competences together through new combinations of concepts. This should 
impart a few promising research perspectives regarding their innovative model 
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A Nonconformist in the Japanese Apparel Industry 
It is hard to disagree that the international recognition of the Japanese technological 
cutting edge has surely resided in the field of electronics, engineering, and applied 
sciences-based manufacturing. Concerning the business arena of public fashion apparel, 
however, there has been no noticeable presence in global perspective so far. In 
borrowing Porter’s framework of national competitiveness
1, Japan showed relative 
weakness in developing a sustainable array of competitive value chains that induced 
innovative business models of fashion apparel.   
Despite some attention-grabbing fashion manifestation by creative Japanese 
designers through the 1970s and the 1980s, the sensation was assessed, then, framed 
within exclusive and exotic luxuries by the Mecca of leading fashion creativity such as 
Paris and New York.
2  So Japanese innovation in fashion was reckoned in the individual 
level, and there was no systematic impact through a novel business model of fashion 
production that jolted international apparel markets. The Japanese apparel production 
was therefore centred upon the limited local demand, and the industrial interest had to 
remain surprisingly domestic.   
The rise of China as the global centre of apparel mass production since the 
end of the 1980s pressurised the Japanese domestic producers to either close down or 
follow the universal trend, i.e. an “exodus” to China for the pursuit of cheaper labour.
3 
This entailed some level of internationalisation, particularly in enhancing the 
cost-saving competence of specified and coordinated production; nonetheless, it was 
involved with no fundamental innovation for the Japanese apparel producers with 
regard to leading new concepts and values in the global fashion business. Although the 
industrialisation of pre-war Japan and the industrial restoration of post-war Japan owed 
considerably to the uncompromised international competitiveness of textile production 
and export, the accomplishment of the textile sector could not attract the globalisation 
of the Japanese fashion apparel. The principal currency of knowledge flows and trend 
creation within the Japanese fashion business has been therefore virtually one-way 
traffic: from Western Europe to Japan, or via USA then to Japan. 
                                            
1  Porter, M. E. (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations.  
2  Tomizawa, O. (2003) Fassion Sangyo Ron, 129-130. Fukai, A. (2001) Fassion Burando 
Besuto 101, 15, 18-19, 20-21. 
3  Yano Keizai Kenkyuusho. Sen’i Hakusho (1984) – (1990). Also, Itami, H. (2001) Nippon No 
Sen’i Sangyou, 44-48.   4
So Japan has never been in the position of leading business models in the 
world of fashion apparel. However, since the epoch of Fast Fashion was marked from 
the mid-1980s, the new business models, originated in USA and Italy, began to provide 
the Japanese apparel industry with a new horizon of innovations. Once again, this 
industrial initiative was an introduction from the West; alongside the soaring 
competitive pressure from the inflowing foreign products, the Japanese fashion apparel 
producers, having been “sandwiched tightly between the prestigious luxury bands from 
Europe and the Asian products with unmatched price competitiveness”, had to explore a 
new source of sustaining their positions in the domestic market.
4  Local leaders such as 
Onward Kashiyama, Renown, Sanyo Shokai, Durban, and Five Fox embarked upon 
corporate-level transformations throughout the 1990s, and this resulted in 
comprehensive permeation of Fast Fashion models into the Japanese apparel business. 
Nevertheless, the so-called industry-wide venture remained to be competitive tactics of 
defending local market shares rather than a strategic big push to enact a much more 
fundamental paradigm change in fashion apparel business.
5  Nothing  decently 
groundbreaking was thus realised until Fast Retailing blazed a new trail of developing 
fashion business from the turn of the century. With its flagship brand, UNIQLO, Fast 
Retailing stood out as an industrial “nonconformist” by rejigging the industrial 
incumbents’ typical product categories as well as value chains. Within a decade since its 
first breakthrough, UNIQLO has grown to be one of the most well-known and popular 
brands not only in Japan but also in East Asia; and now the corporate aim is clarified to 
disseminate its business model in a global scale.
6  For the first time in the history of the 
Japanese apparel industry, a local retailer has just stood up to stretch out its reach to the 
international market systematically: this is the first Japanese fashion apparel producer, 
non-defensive. 
The primary purpose of this study is to discuss the historical context within 
the evolution of an unprecedented paradigm innovation
7   in fashion product 
                                            
4  Sakaguchi, A. (2009) “Nippon Fassion Sijyou No Kaitai To Saikouchiku”, 46-47. Itami, H. 
(ed.) (2001) Nippon No Sen’i Sangyo, Chapter 3 on the industrial structure, Chapter 6 on 
competitive strategy in apparel market. 
5  Senken Shimbunsha (2009) Sen’i Fassion Bijinesu No Rokujyuu Nen. Chapter 4 on Apparel. 
6  The author’s interview with Mr Tadashi Yanai of Fast Retailing, on Friday 24 July 2009, at the 
HQ of Fast Retailing in Kudanshita, Tokyo. Also, Mr Yanai’s presentation at Hitotsubashi 
Business Review Forum, on Thursday 23 July 2009, at Roppongi Academy Hills 40. 
7  Concerning the term, “paradigm innovation”: see the methodology of mapping innovation   5
development, in the case of a Japanese-origin fast fashion brand, UNIQLO, created by 
Fast Retailing Corp. The key theme hereby concerns innovation, and this perspective 
surely necessitates Fast Retailing’s strategic collaboration with a Japanese new material 
and artificial textile powerhouse, TORAY: since TORAY’s technological provision was 
an essential source for the dynamic product and process innovation behind the stunning 
growth of UNIQLO in the past decade. More significantly, the technological superiority 
also entailed its innovative positioning in market competition. It is thus important to 
examine how and why the two brought about their core competences together through 
new combinations of business resources.
8 This should provide a few promising 
research perspectives regarding their innovative business model of unchallenged value 
creation, strong market competitiveness, and sustainable corporate growth. 
 
 
From Unique Clothing Warehouse to UNIQLO 
The origin of Fast Retailing was a local tailor in Ube city, Yamaguchi Prefecture in West 
Japan. Tadashi Yanai in 1984, the present owner and CEO of Fast Retailing, launched 
his first business model of warehouse-style apparel retailing in Hiroshima, and branded 
it as Unique Clothing Warehouse. The conceptual foundation of his shops were a more 
or less ‘mishmash’ of his ideas, absorbed through his frequent visits to USA, Hong 
Kong, and Europe, but obviously, Yanai’s key method of business development was 
based upon nothing but learning by doing.
9 More than a decade since the first launch, 
countless ideas and attempts were made and abolished, then retried, and it is not too 
absurd to denote that there was no concrete business concept surfacing with a solid 
organisational system until it made inroads into Harajuku in November 1998, one of the 
fashion nuclei in Tokyo. Besides, another significance of the inauguration of the 
                                                                                                                                
space. Tidd, J., J. Bessant, K. Pavitt (2005) Managing Innovation, 10-13. For a more 
fundamental study on the concept of paradigm: Kuhn, T. S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. 
8  Yonekura’s research methodology has influenced this approach. See Yonekura, S. (1998) 
“Kei’ei’shi Gaku no Houhou Ron: Itsudatsu, Hukisokusei,   
Shukansei” (The Perspectives of Deviance, Irregularity and Subjectivity in A Methodology of 
Studying Business History); Yonekura, S. (ed.) (2002) Kigyo no Hatten (Growth of 
Corporation), especially, 9-15. 
9 Yanai,  T.  (2003)  Issho Kyuuhai, 27-45: this part well describes the remarkable context of his 
learning from continuous trials and errors.   6
Harajuku shop resided in Yanai’s critical decision of uniting his company’s offerings 
under a new brand name.
10  It was the genesis of UNIQLO. 
  The implications of this “Harajuku Takeoff” should be threefold. Firstly, it 
was certainly the most strategic decision for Yanai to try out his business brainchild of 
15-year learning from the management of Unique Clothing Warehouse since 1984 in a 
variety of regions in Japan as well as a decade of daily learning from the administration 
of his father’s heritage, the local tailor shop. The Harajuku shop signalled Yanai’s 
strategic direction that his business model would be changed from a collection of 
regional apparel warehouses to a fashion apparel retailer, deployed in urban cores. 
Secondly, once being located in the kernel of the Japanese fashion frontier, it is certain 
that the strategic nature of fashion apparel surfaced immediately; Fast Retailing had to 
explore and secure its positioning to establish a competitive brand, i.e. one of the most 
essential immaterial (and invisible) corporate resources.
11 Yanai’s choice was a model 
of fast fashion in evolution, which was originated from USA, e.g. GAP. And lastly, the 
harsh nature of competition in the arena of fashion apparel, which could be in theory a 
virtually atomistic competition particularly in the location like Harajuku, allowed no 
one to stay in the business without outstanding flagship products: put it differently, 
“fashion blockbusters”.   
So Fast Retailing’s first bet was placed upon UNIQLO Fleece. Throughout 
the years of 1999 and 2000, then, Japan witnessed a refreshing sensation in fashion 
apparel: the gross sales of this new company’s fleece recorded approximately 35 
million.
12  The rare megahit under the lasting economic sluggishness was even seen as a 
social syndrome and this enabled Fast Retailing to make a stunning kick start in the 
name of UNIQLO. As a fashion apparel retailer in Japan, the placement of fleece 
products in the frontline was certainly unique enough. Fleece apparels had already been 
offered by the prestigious Japanese sports brands such as Mizuno, but it was categorised 
as a premium outdoor product, usually followed by high prices as well as the advanced 
application of state-of-the-art technological cutting edge for extreme conditions such as 
                                            
10 Yanai,  T.  (2003)  Issho Kyuuhai, 66-69. 
11  Tomizawa, O. (2003) Fassion Sangyo Ron, 127 (on the definition of fashion as a inimitable 
resource in sociological term), 129-130 (on the European leadership in creation of modern 
brands).  
12 Yanai,  T.  (2003) Issho Kyuuhai, 109-112: on the fleece fever.   7
winter mountaineering and the polar exploration.
13  That is to say, fleece was positioned 
in the sphere of the lead-user minority, specifically differentiated from the public 
apparel. Nevertheless, UNIQLO’s initial market penetration en masse was actualised by 
a bold attempt of flipping the established product concept upside down. There, an 
adventurous corporate challenge was enacted. On the superficial level, the distinctive 
product appeal was derived from two perspectives: the revolutionary pricing of 1,900 
Yen, which was never intended in the precedent marketing, and the inexperienced 
playfulness within the band of UNIQLO fleece in 50 vivid colours.
14 However, the 
focal point of the product marketing was placed on somewhere else. Fast Retailing was 
the first Japanese company that succeeded in marking an epoch of the dominance of fast 
fashion in Japan. 
 
 
Into the Arena of Fast Fashion Business 
It is widely accepted that the origin of the era of fast fashion should be traced back to 
the time when GAP of USA in May 1986 declared itself as a new business model that 
entitled ‘Speciality Store Retailer of Private Label Apparel’.
15  Followed by Benetton of 
Italy, the first generation of fast fashion of today was raised in the 2nf half of the 1980s. 
The quintessence of this model resided in the total integration of apparel production, 
namely, covering from the initial design and plan to the sales and marketing to the final 
consumers. This approach entailed a genuine globalisation of the system of fashion 
apparel manufacture under the whole control of the corporate headquarters in 
comprehensive technical impact from computerisation and information technology. 
Rather than enacting ownership of production factories in local vicinities, securing 
contracts with regional producers of supplying cheaper labour cost and reliable skills 
became the key concern of management. Yet in the phase of learning by doing with 
                                            
13  Britain along with USA has been the pioneer of extreme outdoor apparels. Parsons, M. C. 
and M.B. Rose (2009) “Lead User Innovation and the UK Outdoor Trade since 1850”. In Japan, 
the leading brands of outdoor products used to be, Mizuno, Asics, and Descant. 
14  Yunikuro (UNIQLO) (2008) Yunikuro No Dezain (Uniqlo’s Design & Advertisement 
1999-2007), 42-43, 105. 
15  Senken Shimbunsha (1999) Nippon Ryuu SPA No Chousen, 3-5. Yamazaki, M. (2007) 
Gendai Apareru Sangyou No Tenkai, 86-92. (Especially, the author, as the creator of the 
Japanese-style technical term, SPA, explains the details behind the creation of the vocabulary. 
See Column 3, 88-90).   8
ongoing trial and errors, Yanai’s pursuit of a new business model commenced in the 
identical period. His early contracts with domestic apparel producers in China and Hong 
Kong were made from this time as well.
16  
The decade of the 1990s became the crucial phase of global fast fashion firms’ 
full-dressed takeoff, particularly those in Europe. In taking advantage of their 
well-established competitiveness in art and design, the European venture was focused 
upon the intensive enhancement of fashion element within their value chains.
17 The 
typical instance was presented by the brands like Inditex of Spain (owning Zara), H&M 
of Sweden, and NEXT of Britain. Their business value was thus firmly settled in the 
strategic shift from “off-the-peg” to “off-the-catwalk”, i.e. how to accelerate further the 
process of applying the European fashion frontier, shown on the catwalks by top notch 
designers, to street apparels with affordable prices. It should be incorrect that the 
Japanese fashion apparel remained behind. Including World’s (ワールド Wa-Rudo) 
remarkable success in deploying a new fast fashion brand, OZOC, the big names in 
fashion apparel such as Onward Kashiyama and Sanyo Shokai also restructured their 
product portfolios by putting newly developed brands onto the market.
18 Digitalisation 
was applied to every process of management and production on the whole to speed up 
the procedures of product research and development, and most of all, of estimating 
market demand with higher precision.  Nonetheless, their corporate challenge was 
limited to enhance (or sustain) product competitiveness in the domestic market, whilst 
the Europeans and the Americans mobilised their resources for rapidly escalating 
international competition in a global scale. The level of strategic perspective was 
fundamentally different. The aggressive market penetration and domestication of 
refreshing western tags such as GAP and Benetton ate away their market shares and 
obsolete their brand images. Rather than any of spontaneous incentive induced within 
the industry, the external pressure was a more palpable catalyser behind the Japanese 
companies’ hasty shift to the inexperienced area of fast fashion.   
 
 
                                            
16 Yanai,  T.  (2003) Issho Kyuuhai, 39-40. 
17  Kobayashi, M. (2006) Itaria Fassion Gyoukai No Senryaku, Part II, 32-35. 
18  Senken Shimbunsha (1999) Nippon Ryuu SPA No Chousen, Chp.1. World, Chp.2. Ryouhin 
Keikaku (Muji), Chp.3. Sazaby, Chp.4. Sanei International, Chp.5. Nice Claup, Chp.6. 
MokuMoku, Chp.7. Five Fox, Chp.8. Honeys, Chp.9. FDC Products.       9
Fast Retailing Ready 
Until the launch of UNIQLO in 1998, Fast Retailing’s a decade of corporate evolution 
towards a new generation of fast fashion deserves our attention. Yanai’s in-depth 
experience in managing local tailor shops provided two clear rationales for his first 
business shift from men’s tailoring to casual wear retailing from the mid-1980s. His 
visits to university coops in USA inspired him to consider a model of apparel retailing 
without pushy explanations in customer servings, and this was a bold contrast to the 
typical serving customs of men’s tailor shops.
19 Passing the initiative of choice and 
purchase over the customers at his shop was Yanai’s first concept. The other key idea 
concerned his management of sales turnover: certainly, the profit ratio per sale of 
gentlemen’s suits and formal wears was higher than that of casual wears, but more 
significantly, the frequency of purchase was much lower. Yanai’s second rationale was 
based upon the significance of scale and scope in apparel sales.
20 
The twofold logic of his business shift then induced three managerial 
consequences. The first was to focus upon developing a warehouse-style shop of 
customers’ self service, and this propelled the further development of Unique Clothing 
Warehouse and the retreat from the traditional tailoring model. Then, secondly, an 
increasing variety of casual wears that covers a wider scope of preferences from 
different age groups (with different purchasing capabilities) began to make production 
cost a much more strategic matter. Besides, price competitiveness was soon reckoned as 
the essential for faster turnover in sales. Once this perspective was settled in the middle 
of managerial concerns, this rendered China the most appropriate location for 
immediate cost reduction in mass production of casual apparel. In tandem with the 
determined shift of production core into China, Yanai’s research on the apparel 
producers’ business system in the main land, especially those subcontractors of western 
fashion brands in Hong Kong in the 2
nd half of the 1980s, brought forward a model with 
more potential in profit generation.
21 It was a fully combined structure of apparel 
                                            
19 Yanai,  T.  (2003) Issho Kyuuhai, 27-31. 
20 Yanai,  T.  (2003) Issho Kyuuhai,    Yanai’s key concern in corporate growth was speed. 
Obviously, his strategic aim was to fully exploit the competitive advantage of scale and scope of 
an extended organisation under control. Chandler, A. D. Jr. (1990) Scale and Scope: Dynamics 
of Industrial Capitalism. Also see Chandler, A. D. Jr. (1990) “The Enduring Logic of Industrial 
Success.” Harvard Business Review 2, Vol.90: 130-140. 
21 Yanai,  T.  (2003) Issho Kyuuhai, 39-40.   10
production and retailing. So the third move was driven by his attempt of integrating the 
value chain under a unified corporate plan and control. Since Fast Retailing with the 
flagship brand of Unique Clothing Warehouse remained to be specialised in retailing, 
factories were neither established nor acquired. Instead, long-term contracts with 
selected local producers in South China was made to bring forward their ideas, designs 
and concepts of new fashion goods in the unified tag of Unique Clothing Warehouse, 
then to let the Chinese subcontractors manufacture them in accordance with the agreed 
quality and price.
22 It is legitimate to denote that, throughout this attempt of change in 
this period, Yanai’s model was virtually at the forefront in the early conceptual 
evolution of Japanese fast fashion business in international perspective. 
From the first half of the 1990s, Fast Retailing’s strategic direction in product 
development seemed more or less similar to those of rapidly globalising European firms. 
Design research centres were established in Tokyo and New York, and surely, the 
management team placed their principal focus upon reinforcing art and fashion elements 
within newly designed offerings.
23 Whether it was original designs or mimicries and 
derivatives from the catwalks of leading fashion shows, the top value was pursued from 
reflecting the latest fashion trend vividly; the quality of apparel such as durability, and 
textile functions were concerned much afterwards. The competitiveness of fast fashion 
products obviously became more sophisticated: competitive price should come together 
with “instantly appreciative value” in the eyes of urban shoppers chasing the latest 
fashion mode. Regarding this demand, fast fashion producers were pressurised to grasp 
and comply with the creative mass point in dynamically changing street fashion trends 
as soonest as possible: so more efficient information processing surfaced the strategic 
essence. Consequently, the digitalisation of the corporate infrastructure for processing 
information not only with speed but (more significantly) precision became the technical 
                                            
22 Yanai,  T.  (2003) Issho Kyuuhai, 37-40. 
23  ibid. 69-70. Despite the difference in the industrial sphere, the issue of information sharing 
within organisational collaborations for product development might present considerably similar 
perspectives. The following references concerned the viewpoint: Chuma, H. (2000) 
“Determinants of the Shadow Value of Concurrent Information Sharing in Japanese 
Machine-tool Makers”. Moreover, the information sharing certainly concerns the essential 
dynamics within an organisation of multi-product development: the following research also 
provides a critical framework: Nobeoka, K. and M. Cusumano (1997) “Multi-Project Strategy 
and Sales Growth: The Benefits of Rapid Design Transfer in New Product Development.”   11
foundation for operational profits.
24 
The electronic method of Point of Sales (POS) system was already introduced 
by the end of the 1980s, but a mere collection of sales data was insufficient to churn out 
reliable estimations of upcoming market demands. The data set had to be constantly 
updated, accumulated, processed, then analysed by state-of-the-art programming 
techniques to minimise the realistic and inevitable gap between the corporate 
expectation of market demand and the gross size of the actual purchases made at 
shops.
25 It became apparent from this period that the application of Information 
Technology profoundly concerned both the corporate infrastructure for cost-saving 
flexible production and the managerial protocol for profitable mass customisation in 
fashion business.
26 Fast Retailing never stayed behind in terms of the industrial trend. 
By the moment of marking the Harajuku milestone in the autumn of 1998, Fast 
Retailing already complete to sinew its business structure as a model of fast fashion 
retailing en vogue.   
 
 
UNIQLO Shift & Fashion Functionalism 
  Now a burning question is this. During the fleece sensation surrounding the 
year of 2000, was Fast Retailing either alone or outstanding by itself in the Japanese 
fashion business? Certainly not: a majority of the leading Japanese apparel producers 
were successfully transforming themselves into IT-based fast fashion retailers as well.
27 
That is, despite the wide variety in levels of scale and scope of corporate change, most 
of them were in the “race” for more creative business models with more competitive 
brands. UNIQLO was certainly one of them, not the only in the market. Furthermore, it 
was as a matter of fact a completely infant brand, compared to all those well-established 
ones from big firms with long corporate histories. It is rather noteworthy that the 
                                            
24  Senken Shimbunsha (1999) Nippon Ryuu SPA No Chousen, 109-116. 
25  Since the application of IT has become the most strategic backbone of every business model 
in Fast Fashion, no official announcement in public regarding the sources and the contents (or 
any other details) has been made. Fashion apparel powerhouses develop their own IT resources; 
or a wide variety of custom-made IT solutions, programmed by the industrial specialists, would 
be outsourced as well. 
26  This viewpoint is concerned with the debates in Kotha, S. (1995) “Mass Customization: 
Implementing the Emerging Paradigm for Competitive Advantage”. 
27  Senken Shimbunsha (2009) Sen’i Fassion Bijinesu No Rokujyuu Nen. Chapter 4 on Apparel.   12
nation-wide fleece fever began to cool down so swiftly after the winter of 2001, and 
Fast Retailing faced a virtual freefall of its gross sales in the following season.
28 
However, more remarkably, it soon bounced back; throughout the consequent 2000s, the 
company turned out to be the most attention-grabbing Japanese firm owing to its 
surprisingly constant corporate growth and distinguishing business performance.
29 It 
has attracted more attention, as the apparel retailing was never recognised as the 
“spearhead” of the Japanese industrial venture for new sources of international 
competitiveness. Indeed, none of fashion apparel producers, whether or not they 
succeeded in the strategic transformation into advanced fast fashion models with 
sophisticated IT infrastructures, accomplished such growth in the identical period. 
Moreover, some of the much more privileged names in the Japanese apparel history 
were even disappeared due to bankruptcy; some were acquired by others including 
Chinese firms.
30 
  Then, the following question would be significant as well: what made Fast 
Retailing create the fleece fever? A sub-question is, why the company chose not other 
apparel goods but fleece as the initial frontline product in its 1998 Harajuku debut? It 
was a decade before the determined first Tokyo kickoff, in 1988, when Yanai’s project 
of bringing Unique Clothing Warehouse into an international fast fashion business was 
commenced. The principal assignment was to set up its own system of manufacture in 
China, centred in Hong Kong. The production management team deserves our close 
attention: including the manager, Mr Kotani, the team consisted of apparel design 
experts from sports and outdoor wears.
31 This is an important clue that, from the early 
phase of corporate development, Fast Retailing was involved with particular apparels of 
requiring combination of designs and functions. It is worth recalling that the 
inauguration of Unique Clothing Warehouse in 1984 was initiated by Yanai’s concept of 
running an warehouse-style apparel retailing with very high sales turnover, which 
provides quality casual clothes in affordable prices for undifferentiated mass customers. 
Now, in combining the two corporate contexts in production concepts, a simple outdoor 
                                            
28 Yanai,  T.  (2009) Seikou Ha Ichinichi De Sutesare, 16-17. 
29  Fast Retailing Annual Report, 2004-2009. 
30  A good instance is Durban. It used to be one of the most prestigious gentlemen’s formal and 
semi-casual apparel brands in Japan; due to the unrecoverable financial problem, in May 2010, 
the firm was acquired by Xian Dong apparel corp. of China. 
31 Yanai,  T.  (2003) Issho Kyuuhai, 40.   13
product with apprehensible functions such as fleece was a rational choice. Under the 
unified tag, UNIQLO, the outdoor product, which used to be known as high-tech-driven 
(i.e. expensive) but relatively unfashionable (i.e. function-centred), was offered in the 
surprisingly affordable price of 1,900 Yen in a fancy variation of 50 vivid colours. It 
was a virtually perfect materialisation of Yanai’s key ideology of apparel retailing as 
well as Fast Retailing’s technical core competence in product development up to 1998.
32 
With the clarity in Fast Retailing’s offering through a sensible combination of their 
business resources, the value of UNIQLO fleece well appealed to shoppers in high 
streets. So the quick answer to the question above should be Fast Retailing’s innovation 
in realising a new concept of fashion apparel. 
  It is more important to discuss what was clarified and then solidified within 
Fast Retailing’s key strategy of product development throughout the fleece fever of 
1999-2001 rather than the extraordinary occurrence itself. The outstanding sales figure 
of 35 million pieces let the management of Fast Retailing convinced with the vast 
potential in the innovative combinations of apparel functions and fashionableness. 
Fleece was a starting point that provided the management with confidence in the 
evolving corporate-level strategy afterwards. The learning thus induced a new business 
paradigm, namely, fashion functionalism. Furthermore, this turned out to be the 
conceptual scaffoldings to bring upon “UNIQLO Shift”, which was a whole 
re-categorisation of fashion clothing within a new frame of apparel functions such as 
keeping warmth and coolness, dryness and moisture, skin health and environment 
friendliness and so on.
33  
The essential breakthrough of the UNIQLO Shift resided in the following 
two-fold consequences. Firstly, the new perspective of categorising the mass consumers 
into functions broke down all the traditional fashion marketing divisions, based upon 
age groups, genders, regional and geographical elements, cultural factors, or 
purchasing-power-related factors etc. This certainly rendered Yanai’s business ideology 
                                            
32  Regarding the concept of “core competence” or the resource-based approach, the following 
references provide essential grounds for further debates: Prahalad, C. K. and G. Hamel (1990) 
“The Core Competence of The Corporation”; Aoshima, Y. and T. Kato (2003) Kyoso Senryaku 
Ron, 85-112; Itami, H. and T. Numagami (1992) “Dynamic Interaction between Strategy and   
Technology”. 
33  Yunikuro (UNIQLO) (2008) Yunikuro No Dezain (Uniqlo’s Design & Advertisement 
1999-2007), 35-37.   14
of offering quality goods to undifferentiated mass customers. Then, the second upshot 
was concerned with opening a wide window of creating new business models between 
fashion apparel retailing and top-notch textile and material producers, especially those 
in Japan. The fashion functionalism requires a solid technological substance to actualise 
both uniqueness and sustainability within apparel functions. That is, without the 
advanced technologies of new textiles and materials, the business paradigm cannot lead 
the creative fashionableness from apparel products. Since the industrialisation in the 
Meiji era, Japan has been blessed by world-class textile producers’ innovations and 
growth, and their corporate “locomotion” was one of the most critical sources of both 
pre-war economic growth and post-war quick recovery.
34  The global powerhouses such 
as TORAY, TEIJIN, KURARAY, UNITIKA and so on, have been architecting the 
milieux of new high-tech textiles and materials. The fashion functionalism became a 
new business plate forme where Fast Retailing and those Japanese textile giants could 
explore not only profitable business opportunities in new joint product development but 
also creative organisational forms for more efficient collaboration. To put it simply, this 
new paradigm provides the two sides with more potential business grounds for mapping 
out so-called win-win strategies. It is legitimate to conclude that Fast Retailing’s 
paradigm innovation, followed by the daring UNIQLO Shift, was therefore the most 
essential breakthrough throughout the fleece fever and the principal foundation of the 
corporate takeoff since then.   
 
 
Rise of the Magnificent Combo & Mass-User Innovation 
UNIQLO’s post-fleece growth was driven by a series of megahit products. One of them 
was Heat-Tech, as being named, the brand was defined by the distinctive function of 
conserving warmth. It required a new compound of artificial fibres with specific 
technologies of textile production; that is to say, the field of research and development 
theoretically belonged to the high-tech textile producers. Regarding the development of 
Heat-Tech, Fast Retailing relied upon TORAY’s technology, but even before the debut 
of this new output, TORAY was already involved with the production of UNIQLO 
                                            
34  Senken Shimbunsha (2009) Sen’i Fassion Bijinesu No Rokujyuu Nen. See Chapter 1 on 
Gosen (Artificial Textiles), 24-37. Also see Itami, H. (2001) Nippon No Sen’i Sangyo, 48-55.   15
fleece from 1998.
35 The committed collaboration between the two commenced in the 
middle of the fleece fever, i.e. 2000, and this deserves some discussion. Until the 
UNIQLO sensation, TORAY was a textile supplier for fleece production, but once Fast 
Retailing’s capacity of product development and marketing was proven by the sales 
performance, the textile giant was convinced to blaze a new trail of the next blockbuster 
together with this young apparel retailer. For TORAY, there was nothing to lose in 
formulating a close alliance with, now, such an energetic retailer with massive outlets to 
the public mass market. In addition, as Yanai and his top management team brought 
themselves to the headquarters of TORAY in order to propose a strategic collaboration, 
the commitment became certain in Japanese manner. Nevertheless, it is worth denoting 
that the two kept the cooperation neither formal nor on-the-document (on-the-record) 
until they made an official announcement before the public in 2006.
36 
  The first generation of Heat-Tech was unveiled in 2003, and immediately 
from the year of the debut, it replaced the fascia of UNIQLO. Within four years after the 
first appearance, Fast Retailing made a sales record of 64.5 million pieces.
37 Behind  the 
boom, the implication of the Heat-Tech was threefold: first of all, it was obviously a 
would-be frontline product that extracted the essential function of the predecessor, i.e. 
conserving warmth. Through the fleece sensation, the apparel function as a fashion 
appeal was popularised enough, so the introduction sensibly saved information cost. 
Heat-Tech paved a sensible path of business rationality, derived from the management’s 
evolutionary perspective on product development.
38 Secondly, it represented Fast 
                                            
35 Yanai,  T.  (2009) Seikou Ha Ichinichi De Sutesare, 114-116. This fact was also denoted by Mr 
Ogawa: Interview with Mr Ogawa, in charge of the “Uniqlo Office” in TORAY HQ, on Monday 
13 April 2009 at Roppongi Hills, Tokyo. 
36  Interview with Mr Ogawa, in charge of the “Uniqlo Office” in TORAY HQ, on Monday 13 
April 2009 at Roppongi Hills, Tokyo. Also, Yanai, T. (2009) Seikou Ha Ichinichi De Sutesare, 
236. (The formal contract for the official strategic alliance was made in June 2006.) 
37 Yanai,  T.  (2009)  Seikou Ha Ichinichi De Sutesare, 117. 
38  The evolutionary view on technological development provides a reliable theoretical context 
to analyse fashion product development as well, based particularly upon UNIQLO’s 
functionalism and positive application of high-tech textiles. See the introductory discussion of 
Ziman, J. (ed.) (2000) Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process. Besides, the 
following reference also imparts a helpful case for studying the TORAY-UNIQLO cooperation 
in product development. Iansiti, M. (1995) “Technology Integration: Managing Technological 
Evolution in a Complex Environment”. The constant learning (both organisational and 
individual level) during product designs and development should be certainly another essential 
element within the evolutionary feature: Van de Ven, A. and D. Polley (1992) “Learning While 
Innovating”.   16
Retailing’s choice of artificial textiles as the principal foundation for research and 
development rather than natural materials. This was based upon the company’s 
understanding of the potential in artificial fibres for its fashion functionalism.
39 Last  but 
not least, the commercialisation of Heat-Tech concerned Fast Retailing’s product 
strategy of Kaizen, i.e. continuous amelioration. In the following year of 2004, the 2
nd 
generation was marketed with its additional function of antimicrobial treatment, then, 
moisturising function was introduced in the next version. In 2007, Fast Retailing and 
TORAY announced the launch of the new Heat-Tech with semi-permanency of all 
functions, introduced in the previous generations. The product evolution never stopped: 
TORAY’s new lacto-fibre was applied to enhance softness as well as moisturising effect. 
Then, in the latest series, the functions of crease resistance and of static electricity 
prevention were combined; besides, the colour variation was furthered for 
fashionableness.
40   The gist of this remarkable evolution exists in the organic 
collaboration between TORAY and Fast Retailing. For they engaged in the product 
design and development from the level of textile material to the sales strategy as one, 
the full-dressed Kaizen has been possible, and the mass customers have bought the 
visibly evolving value with little hesitation. 
  As shown in the remarkable context of product development, the 
TORAY-UNIQLO combo brought about a novel business model that would facilitate 
mass-user innovation. Owing to the bold concept of functionalism, from the inceptive 
phase of product design, their collaboration was not constrained by the traditional 
agenda of categorising differentiated fashion consumers; the concept of Heat-Tech for 
instance concerned an utterly undifferentiated mass population, simply prone to expect 
warmth and affordability. Rather than the inevitably dynamic characteristics of seasonal 
fashion vogue, they could prioritise the key assignment of what is fundamentally needed 
from apparel functions and what is technologically possible from their corporate 
resources. Mainly Fast Retailing covered the former whilst the latter belonged to 
                                            
39  The author’s interview with Mr Tadashi Yanai of Fast Retailing, on Friday 24 July 2009, at 
the HQ of Fast Retailing in Kudanshita, Tokyo. 
40  Full exploitation of a wide array of interactive advertisement medias has been the most 
strategic perspective for the completion of product development within Fast Fashion’s 
management team. See Yunikuro (UNIQLO) (2008) Yunikuro No Dezain (Uniqlo’s Design & 
Advertisement 1999-2007), 42-43, 104-111, 194-202 (interviews in English).     17
TORAY.
41 Once the most basic (but strategic as well) requirements within the new 
product value were fulfilled, then the two could shift their focus upon the secondary 
elements those could effectively reinforce the primary; additional functions including 
anti-wrinkle were applied to later versions to prove the betterment in evolution. Another 
source for further value additions ex post facto requisite technological applications 
certainly resided in the enhancement of “art factors” such as sophisticated colour 
matching, subtle garment cutting, and silhouette design.
42  
So the technical substance of this evolutionary approach was concerned 
tightly with a couple of the following strategic perspectives: targeting the 
undifferentiated consumers for determined mass production, and securing the initiative 
of creating mass consumption en vogue in accordance with the mass users unchanging 
wants. The powered mechanism of this mass-user innovation is thus different from the 
well-established model of lead-user innovation, remarkably theorised by von Hippel.
43 
On the contrary to the one-way flow of disseminating context of new breakthroughs 
from a minor group of avant-couriers to the uninterested mass public, the mass-user 
innovation is driven by the dynamic tension amongst what is possible from the offering 
side, what is valuable from the intermediating body, and what is needed from the 
consuming mass. This model necessitates ever intensive processing of technical 
information in mass quantity in order to retain the signalling precision between the 
enmeshed fabrics of product supply and market demand. It is worth denoting that, in the 
annual meeting of 2005, Yanai declared that the de facto technical backbone of his 
business model concerned information technology rather than apparel production. His 
perception concerns fashion apparel as bodies of information and knowledge: and this 
standpoint relates to his view that the traditional belief of fashion within the elegant 
sphere of abstract art can be redefined within the dry business term of ‘industrial 
                                            
41  Interview with Mr Ogawa, in charge of the “Uniqlo Office” in TORAY HQ, on Monday 13 
April 2009 at Roppongi Hills, Tokyo. 
42  Yanai, T. (ed.) (2009) UNIQLO Sikoujyutsu, 16-26: The art director Mr Kawashima Sato’s 
concept of being “super-rational” in product design and development well represents the 
substance of UNIQLO’s approach in fashion aestheticism.     
43  von Hippel, E. (1986) “Lead Users: A source of Novel Product Concepts,” 791-793; 
von Hippel, E. (1988) The Sources of Innovation; von Hippel, E. (2006) Democratizing 
Innovation, 22-31. Also see Parsons, M. C. and M.B. Rose (2009) “Lead User Innovation and 
the UK Outdoor Trade since 1850”, 2-4. Parsons, M. and M. B. Rose (2010) Innovation, 
Entrepreneurship and Networks, 48-54.   18
product’.
44  
  Under the UNIQLO banner of fashion functionalism, Fast Retailing defined 
itself as the 3
rd generation of fast fashion business model.
45  The pioneering group with 
the unprecedented creativity of the 1980s including GAP and Benetton was placed in 
the 1
st, and the rush of Europeans with catwalk exquisiteness in the following decade 
was tagged as the stylish opener of the 2
nd stage. Certainly, the daring application of 
functionalism was groundbreaking enough to reform the domestic industrial contour 
within such a short period of corporate takeoff; and the extraordinary sales records of 
the past decade and today reflect mass consumers’ response from the market side. In 
this article, another notable innovative perspective in the strategic collaboration between 
TORAY and Fast Retailing then inhabits in their organisational formation. Despite their 
organic co-works from the stage of brainstorming the concepts of new products and 
selecting applicable fibres and textile technologies, the two firms have brought forward 
no financial relations concerning the realisation of mass-user innovation. Now it is 
known that TORAY has established an array of exclusive product lines for UNIQLO 
and let the committed production stop and go according to Fast Retailing’s analysis of 
market demand. Nevertheless, no information has been disclosed that any financial 
arrangement between the two was necessitated in their collaboration. In Yonekura’s 
term, their organisational form is conceptualised as Virtual Vertical Integration.
46 It is 
obvious that the two-tier cooperation has constituted a consolidated value chain of 
profitable fashion apparel business. The two companies, however, have not set up any 
of typical joint ventures nor holding companies in between. The business context of 
                                            
44  The author’s interview with Mr Tadashi Yanai of Fast Retailing, on Friday 24 July 2009, at 
the HQ of Fast Retailing in Kudanshita, Tokyo. 
45 Yanai,  T.  (2009)  Seikou Ha Ichinichi De Sute Sare, 123-125. Also, denoted during The 
author’s interview with Mr Tadashi Yanai of Fast Retailing, on Friday 24 July 2009, at the HQ 
of Fast Retailing in Kudanshita, Tokyo. 
46  Yonekura proposed this term for the presentation at the international videoconference 
(UK-JAPAN-USA-CANADA), organised by INNOVEX 2010, on Wednesday 28 April 2010. A 
similar viewpoint was already denoted in, Yonekura, S. (1997) Nijyuu Seiki Gata Kigyou 
Moderu Tono Ketsubetsu (Departure from the 20
th-century Model of Corporation). Also a 
remarkable theoretical argument regarding alliance designs was developed in: Doz, Y. L., A. 
Cuomo, and J. Wrazel (2007) From Leadership to Management: Mobilizing Knowledge for 
Innovation in Strategic Alliances, 313-316. Furthermore, from the analytical standpoint of 
theories of business architecture, the following will provide a good substance for thoughts: 
Fujimoto, T., A. Takeishi, and Y. Aoshima (eds.) (2001) Bijinesu Aakitekucha, Chapter.2, 
especially. 64-67.     19
value creation was vertically integrated through their partnership, but the group effort 
was financially non-cross-organisational.
47 Yet, the unexplored corporate perspective 
must call for more debates on the strategic nature of the Japanese-style alliances. This 




This wrap-up underlines the three significant perspectives regarding the key success 
factors of the TORAY-UNIQLO combo. The quintessence of the breakthrough was 
found in the inexperienced paradigm shift within fashion apparel business, and the 
paradigm innovation was derived from the particular historical context in the evolution 
of Fast Retailing. The genesis of the landmark ‘irregularity’ in the business history of 
the Japanese apparel manufacture, with countless regularities in the path-dependence of 
concepts as well as domestic business models, surely deserves closer attentions from the 
academia. In the milieu of business paradigm, another breakthrough in the UNIQLO 
model settled in the unique mindset of perceiving the mass market in a global scale 
from the beginning and of extending their original system of value chains to abroad 
rather than merely staying in and defending the ‘comfy but so crowded’ home islands. 
The nonconformist’s approach to fashion business with functionalism helped the young 
company to successfully link itself to the vast domestic pool of the distinguished 
technological cutting-edge in artificial textiles and new materials. The corporate 
endeavour at ting up with the global powerhouse such as TORAY was indisputably 
sensible to spearhead the value creation of functionalism through determined 
application of the state-of-the-art technologies. Thus, the second key perspective in the 
success factors was technological. It is illegitimate to look over the technological 
capacity of TORAY in terms of arguing the success of UNIQLO. The last viewpoint 
concerned the theme of organisational uniqueness within the virtual vertical integration 
between the two. More than a derivative of network forms, the TORAY-UNIQLO 
collaboration was derived from their extraordinary partnership from organic product 
development to efficient mass customisation. Regardless of this understanding, the 
‘black box’ in the visible organisational dynamics between the two was left untouched 
                                            
47  Interview with Mr Ogawa, in charge of the “Uniqlo Office” in TORAY HQ, on Monday 13 
April 2009 at Roppongi Hills, Tokyo.   20
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